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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate differential 
social relationships and verbal communication strategies as poten-
tial sources of systematic error in game theory. Specifically, 
the study focused upon friendship as an antecedent influence and 
communication as-a process variable aff~cting the agreements reached 
in mixed-motive interpersonal negotiations. 
The theory of negotiated games was examined and considered 
-
as a tool for the evaluation of contextual conflict interaction. 
The most primary assumptions of game theory were reviewed. It was 
suggested that although game theory is a useful model, actual human 
interaction is more complex that the theory implies. It was pre-
dicted that friendship would serve as a competitive influence in 
negotiations leading to solutions which would differ from those 
predicted by game theory. It was further predicted that friends 
would display a larger number of competitive verbal communication 
) 
strategies that non-friends. Finally, it was predicted that com-
pet~tive verbal strategies would be associated with less efficient 
( 
solutions, and that cooperative strategies would be associated with 
the more efficient solutions. 
To test these predictions, thirty dyads were recruited to, 
participate in a bargaining session which was structured·to be 
mixed-motive in nature. The subject's verbalizations and solu-
tions were recorded and subjected to analysis. 
The results indicated that friends selected the most effi-
cient agreements, but they did not employ more competitive or 
J 
ii. 
cooperative verbal strategies. Finally, no significant relation-
ship was found between verbal communication strategies and solution 
efficiency. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1. 
The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate differential 
social relationships and verbal communication strategies as poten-
tial sources of systematic error in game theory. More particularly, 
the study focused upon "friendship" as an antecedent influence and 
communication as a process variable affecting the agreements reached 
in mixed-motive interpersonal negotiations. 
The thrust of the study was twofold. First, it attempted to 
exami~e empi-rical ly some theoretical relationships between two 
isolated variables upon each oth7r, and of the two variables upon 
the relative efficiency of the solutions reached in mixed-motive 
interaction. A second aim of the study was to generate ideas and 
targets for further research in areas which have received little 
empirical investigation. 
Background 
The theory of negotiated games is useful for the study of 
human conflict because it specifies normative characteristics 
and rules of decision behavior by which contextual conflict 
interactions may be evaluated. Gaming models are also useful 
because they have a degree of predictive power for the outcome 
of the conflict within th~ limitations ~mposed by their assump-
tion of "rational" gaming behavior. 
Often, however, game theory has been criticized because-it 
fails to consider non-rational, but realistic elements of decision-
making. Harsanyi (_1960) makes precisely this point: "In the case 
of bargaining, of course, it is obvious enough that the outcome 
is often affected by irrational behavior on the part of either 
party (or both parties)." (p.193) Moreover, Rapoport (1966) ques-
tions the extent to which game theory approximates actual human 
decision-making: 
Game theory, as it w~s formulated by mathematicians 
is not equipped to deal with these matters, because 
there is no room in that theory for the psychological 
make-up of the participants. To the extent that 
psychological matters are allowed to enter a theory 
of conflict, the theory ceases to be a model of 
rational conflict •••• At least 'rationality' must 
be modified to a relative concept to be put into_ 
specific psychological contexts. (p.206) 
2. 
One consequence of the self-imposed limitations of game theory is 
that a large proportion o~ empirical gaming research has focused 
upon discovering systematic error in the formal gaming model. This 
study identifies friendship and verbal communication strategy as 
two likely sources of systematic error. 
The Gaming Model 
Since this study predicted systematic deviation from the gaming 
model, it is necessary to review in summary form some of the assump-
tions made by game theory. 
First, game theory assumes that individuals develop ordered 
preferences toward alternative behaviors based upon some utility 
function. Formally, if X[n1 , n 2 , n 3 , •• nz] represents a set 
of alternatives, and U[na] represents the relative value or utility 
of selecting som~ alternative, then n1 should be ordered (preferred) 
prior to n 2 if and only if U[n1 ]~U[n2]. In words, individuals should 
conceptualize their alternatives for a given situation such that 
the alternatives are ordered from greatest to least utility. For 
example, if profit is a salesperson's primary motivation, and if 
the sale of product X results in greater profit than the sale of 
product Y, then X should be a preferred alternative over Y. 
3. 
A second assumption of game theory is known as "utility maxi-
mization." This assumption is that individuals will behave so as 
I 
to maximize their gains or utility in their relationships with others. 
(Beisecker, 1970) Hence, not only should people be capable of-
ordering their preferences from greatest to least utility, but they 
should also behave in a manner which maximizes their gains. In the 
previous example, the salesman should attempt t9 maximize his profit 
by selling product X if he can. 
A third assumption made by game theory is that individuals will 
agree upon the most efficient solution when engaged in a mixed-motive 
situation. Both efficiency and mixed-motivation require definitions 
here. The efficiency concept is explained formally by Harasanyi (1961), 
and is simplified by Beisecker (1970) as follows: 
If two solutions, A and Bare such that A provides 
at least equal rewards to all participants- and 
greater rewards for some participants than B, 
then A is said to be a more efficient solution 
than B • ( p • 15 On ) 
Efficiency, then, could be considered the maximization of joint gain 
between two interdependent parties. In the example of the salesman, 
the sales of product Xis the most efficient solution only if the 
buyer realizes rewards equal to or greater than what he would 
realize from buying product Y. Hence, the most efficient solution 
need not maxiMize the gain or utility of either party, but rather 
denotes the solution whereby the Joint gain between parties is 
maximized. 
4. 
Finalfy, it is useful to define the phrase "mixed-motive 
interaction." In the conflict arena, the term Mixed-motive refers 
to a dual motivation on the part of the interdependent parties who 
are trying to achieve some goal. On the one hand, it is in the 
interest of the parties to compete with each other in order to max-
imize their own respective gains. Since the parties are interdependent 
and can therefore interfere to some extent with each other's pursuit 
of the goal, it is also in both parties' interest to cooperate with 
each other. A mixed-motive interaction can therefore be defined 
as activity where structure or circuMstances generate both com-
petitive and cooperative motives in the participants. In the 
example of the salesman and potential buyer, the mixed-Motives 
of each can be cast quite clearly. It is, of course, in the interest 
of the salesperson to compete with the buyer, perhaps by consistently 
demanding a high price for product X. Likewise, it is in the buyer's 
interest to offer a small price for the product. In both cases, 
the obJective is to realize maxinurn individual gains without 
regard for the gains of the other party. However, a motive of 
cooperation should also exist if the parties are interdependent to 
even a small extent. The salesman may lose the potential buyer 
altogether if the former is not willing to be flexible in his 
pricing. Likewise, the buyer may not obtain a desired product if 
he is not willing to raise his offer for that product. In either 
~-
case, the outcome for both may be less than had they reached 
a point of commercial agreement. Many interactions are structurally 
similar to the seller/buyer exa~ple and can therefore be cast as 
mixed-motive. 
In summary, game theory assumes that individuals are capable 
of ordering their preferences with respect to utility functions, 
and behaving so as to maximize their gains. In mixed-motive 
situations, participants should arrive at the most efficient 
solution. Once values have been assigned to all alternatives 
for each participant, the most efficient solution can be specified. 
Methods for the mathematical derivation of solutions are explicated 
fully in a~number of places (Harsanyi, 1961; Nash, 1950; Von Neuman 
and Morgenstern, 1953). 
Social Applications of Game Theory 
Although game theory offers a useful model for evaluating 
real life interpersonal negotiation, there are Many possible influ-
ences which may lead to solutions or outcomes which are different 
than those predicted by the theory. In the seller/buyer example, 
no assumption was made concerning the social relationship between 
the two individuals. Indeed, the same solution would be predicted 
whether the individuals were totally unacquainted, sworn enemies 
or the best of friends, although common sense might lead to anticipate 
different solutions in each case. In other words, the comMercial 
attractiveness of alternatives might remain constant, but the psycho-
logical and social factors may be important as well. For exaMple, if the 
seller and buyer are friends, then each might expect a good deal 
of deference on the part of the other. Such expectations could 
conceivably alter both bargaining behavior and the solution which 
is reached by adding a non-rational element to the negotiations. 
It will be useful to dwell on the concepts of friendship and 
acquaintance because structural differences in social involvement 
can be considered a realistic element in social interaction, and 
therefore negotiation. 
In a structural sense, friendship may be distinguished from 
6. 
the class of general social relationships in that the former requires 
voluntary establishment and naintenance, whereas the latter may be 
optional or mandatory. Suttles (1970) explains that: "Friendship 
is perceived directly as a neans of going beyond prescribed institu-
tional or organizational affiliations." (p.97) One necessary 
characteristic of friendship is a high degree of voluntary inter-
dependence. 
A second defining characteristic of friendship is that such 
relations involve mutual positive evaluation as "person-qua-person," 
i.e., as sources of intrinsic satisfaction. (Wright, 1978) For 
purposes of this investigation, friendship shall be defined as a 
dyadic relationship characterized by a high degree of voluntary 
interdependence and person-qua-person appreciation for the relation-
ihip. The term "acquaintance" shall be used for reference to a 
relationship characterized by a moderate degree of VI (voluntary 
interdependence) and PQP (person-qua-person) appreciation. The 
term "non-acquaintances" shall be used to refer to those who have 
not previously interacted. 
Although friendship may influence interpersonal negotiations 
in some ways, it is not altogether easy to predict systematically 
either the character of the negotiations or the results from the 
influence. One "common sense" notion is that friends should be 
more cooperative than non-friends in negotiation because of their 
positive affect towards each other. An equally plausible notion_ 
7. 
is that friends may actually be less cooperative than non-friends 
because of greater stability and ego-involvement in the former 
relation. Vinacke (1969) poihts out that: "In fact, the friendship 
relation can have two different implications in games, either signi-
fying the freedom to play competitively (so long as the basic relation 
is not violated), or constraint against offending each other." (p.203) 
Hence, either of two social norms could be in operation during nego-
tiations, leading to deviation from game theoretic solutions. 
A second major weakness of game theory is that it does not 
address the role of explicit verbal communication in the negotiation 
process. Frost and Wilmont (1978) ~aintain that the single greatest 
limitation of game theory is its relative disregard for the importance 
of verbal communication. (p.72) 
Game theory assumes that all particip~nts possess complete and 
accurate information concerning each other's preferences, alternatives 
and bargaining positions. Obviously, in order to arrive at the most 
efficient solution, participants must be capable of identifying 
that solution. In order to identify the most efficient solution, 
the participants must know or be able to estimate each other's 
utility functions and preferences, since the for~er is a function 
of the latter. Although it is possible that the information will 
be known to participants prior to the negotiations (perhaps from 
past negotiations), in practice, the exchange of information is 
made through some form of interpersonal comMunication. Hence, 
communication must be considered a structural prerequisite to 
negotiation. As Schelling (1960) notes: 
It means that tacit and explicit bargaining are 
not thoroughly separate concepts but that the 
various gradations froM tacit bargaining up 
through types of incompleteness or faulty or 
limited communication to full communication all 
show some dependence on the need to coordinate 
expectations. (p.73) 
The function of verbal communication need not be limited to 
8. 
the exchange of factual information, however. Although communication 
structure is necessary for negotiations to take place, the content 
of communications can be critical in the formation and alteration 
of perceptions. Indeed, verbal communications may influence the 
interpretation and evaluation of any aspect of the negotiations. 
In this respect, communication may properly be considered a tool 
of strategy, i.e., an instrument which can be used for the purpose 
of effecting certain outcomes. Unfortunately, communication content 
has been largely ignored in the eMpirical investigation of gaming 
behavior. Consequently, little is known about the selection or 
efficacy of verbal communication strategies in negotiation. 
In summary, the gaMe theoretic model of bargaining does not 
address differences in social relationship or verbal communication 
strategy selection, both of which may be sources of systeMatic 
error in that model. Friendship, as structurally defined in terms 
of voluntary interdependence and intrinsic relational satisfaction, 
may conceivably influence the negotiation process and subsequent 
solution. In particular, friendship ITTay either enhance cooperation 
or intensify competition in negotiations. ComMunication is both a 
structural prerequisite and a tool of strategy in bargaining and 
can therefore influence the solution to negotiations. Both friend-
ship and communication strategy need further investigation to assess 
more adequately their importance in interpersonal negotiation. 
In an attempt to further empirical investigation of these variables, 
the present study was guided by three research questions: 
1. Does friendship influence the selection of verbal 
communication strategies in mixed-motive interactions? 
2. Does friendship influence the solutions reached in 
mixed-motive interactions? 
3. Does communication strategy influence the solutions 
reached in Mixed-motive interactions? 
Chapter Two surveys the literature pertaining to these questions 
for purposes of building theoretical answers and predictions. 
CHAPTER TWO 
RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature pertaining to friendship and communication 
strategy can be treated with respect to both theoretical and 
empirical research in each area. 
Friendship 
10. 
The theoretical literature relating to friendship in negotia-
tion is largely prescriptive rather than descriptive, and it has a 
limited usefulness in terms of prediction. Nevertheless, a number 
of sources can be extracted which offer a fairly consistent view 
of the behavior of friends in conflict interaction. This view 
can be expressed in the proposition that friends tend to take a 
very competit~ve approach to conflicts, i.e., an orientation which 
focuses upon maximizing one's own gains without regard for the other's 
'-- gains. 
A number of sources suggest that the high level of voluntary 
interdependence associated with friendship generates a high level 
of ego-involvement, which in turn may intensify conflicts. Put 
in somewhat different terms, the voluntary interdependence and 
positive affect displayed between friends may be viewed as an 
investment with the expectation of some return. Where there is 
a tremendous investment, the participants may perceive a fairly 
limited range of acceptable "returns." The theories of Coser 
(1956), Suttles (1970), and Wright (1978) all support the view 
that a great deal of voluntary interdependence 1.s associated with 
a large degree of ego-involvement, which should intensify conflicts 
of interest. 
11. 
If friends do tend to become more ego-involved than non-friends 
in similar conflict situations, then there is theoretical support 
for the proposition that friends should behave more competitively 
" than non-friends. The Social ~udgement-Involvement theory (Sherif, 
Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965) maintains that as individuals become 
more ego-involved with respect to an issue, the range of positions 
on that issue which are perceived to be "acceptable" is constricted. 
In other words, an individual who is highly ego-involved with respect 
to some.issue should have a more defined and inflexible position on 
the issue than a less ego-involved person. 
In the arena of interpersonal negotiations, the Social Judgement-
Involvement theory seems to support the view that· friends behave 
more competitively than do less voluntarily interdependent individuals. 
Friends who perceive conflicting interests in a situation may be, 
expected to be more ego-involved in the conflict. If they are more 
ego-involved, then their respective ranges of acceptable agreements 
should be smaller than those for less ego-involved individuals. Con-
sequently, one could infer that greater perceived conflict would 
generate competitive approaches to the conflict. In any case, some 
friends may employ competitive tactics in conflict situations ,because 
they are more ego-involved than ,in a less interdependent relation. 
A second reason why friends may be more competitive in conflict 
than non-friends is related to the stability of the relationship. 
In short, the satisfaction intrinsic in the relationship and what-
ever extrinsic rewards are consistently obtained may lend a stability 
to the relationship which actually sanctions competitive sorts of' 
behavior. Borgatta (1954) explains: 
Prior experience indicates that in interaction, 
unfriendly acts, if the interaction is to be 
maintained, are carried out only in the tolerat-
ing social situation; that is, if the social 
situation is to maintain itself, hostility can 
occur only in circumstances where more permanent, 
underlying ties have already formed or exist ••• " (p. 74) 
12. 
It seems plausible that friends May engage in competitive behavior 
because the degree of toleration for such behavior is greater than 
in less stable forms of social relationship. Moreover, Wright draws 
a distinction between friendship and friendly relations (based upon 
the two structural components VI and PQP appreciation) and observes: 
Friendly relations are characterized hy the inter-
actants seeking out and pursuing 'integrating 
topics' to sustain, if not expand, their interac-
tion. Therefore, we should expect communication 
in friendly relations to stress agreement and 
reciprocity •••• Apparently, in the more comfor-
table and less formal context of deeper friendship, 
the partners do not feel they owe it to one another, 
out of politeness or decency, to exchange trust for 
t rus t • ( p • 2 O 3 ) 
Wright's obersvation is not only consistent with previously cited 
literature, but it also lends explanation to Vinacke's conclusion 
that friendship May either enhance cooperation or intensify competi-
tion. The difference in observed behavior may be a function of 
measurable differences in the degree of friendship. In any case, 
the literature tends to support a tentative proposition that: 
Higher levels of voluntary interdependen~e and person-qua-person 
appreciation should correlate with a more competitive orientation 
to interpersonal conflict situations. 
The empirical literature pertaining to friendship in gaming 
behavior neither confirms nor denies the preceding proposition. 
Rather, the results of gaming studies conflict with regard to 
whether friends behave more or less competitively in simulated 
conflict situations. 
Empirical _study of friendship in gaming has been limited for 
the most part to matrix games where explicit verbal communication 
13. 
is not permitted. In one such study conducted by Oskamp and Perlman 
(1966), a group of college students who considered th~mselves friends 
behaved more cooperatively than did students who did not consider 
themselves friends. Curiously, the authors obtained opposite ·results 
when they administered the experiment at a different college. Greater 
competition was displayed by "best friends" than by any other group, 
including individuals who disliked each other. A different study 
(Swingle and Gillis, 1968) found that overall friends selected more 
cooperative choices than other groups, and that the subjects' beha-
vior tended to match that of the opponent, whether the opponent 
'behaved competitively or cooperatively. Finally, in a study of 
triadic gaming behavior (Iwakami, 1960), there were essentially no 
differences between friends and nonfriends with respect to competi-
tion and cooperation. 
The sampling of studies outlined above indicates that no clear 
and consistent conclusions can be drawn concerning friendship in 
bargaining or negotiation from such matrix-type games. Of course, 
a number of factors could account for discrepancies in the findings 
of those studies. Two items in particular seem to deserve attention 
in the context of the present study._ 
First, there has been a general lack of standardization and 
validation of an instrument to measure friendship. For the most 
part, the definition of friendship in empirical gaming studies has 
14. 
been lef~ to subJects themselves to make within broad guidelines. 
Oskamp and Perlman, for example, simply asked subjects to list the 
I 
names of persons that they considered best friends, acquaintances, 
etc. Although such an approach may be practical, there is little 
assurance that subjects actually maintained a uniform interpreta-
tiqn of friendship. A standardized instrument for the measurement 
of friendship would seem to contribute both to an understanding of 
what is being measured, and to the interpretability of the results 
in empirical studies. 
A second problem with empirical studies of friendship in gaming 
is that the format of such studies has generally not permitted ver-
bal communications between the participants. As noted previously, 
verbal communication is a realistic element of negotiation. Although 
a matrix-type format may approximate human decision behavior, a 
better approximation should include the o~portunity for explicit 
-
verbal interaction between the participants. 
Communication Strategy 
The theoretical literature pertaining to communication strategy 
is devoted largely to communication structure rather than communica-
tion content. A number of authors acknowledge the importance of 
communication content without providing much detail. Wrightsman 
(1972), for example, points out that the content of communication 
can have a bearing on the outcome of games of strategy. Rapoport 
(1974) and others stress the importance of free communication to the 
coordination of expectations and, hence, to cooperation. Vinacke 
(1969) notes, however, that communication can as easily be used to 
defeat or take advantage of an opponent as to cooperate with him, 
"In line with a point made previously, communication can be used 
for various purposes, not only to sound out a player, but also to 
deceive him (them)." (p. 3 03) 
15. 
Perhaps the most developed theoretical work concerning communi-
cation content as a tool of strategy is that of Beisecker (1970). 
In particular, Be1.secker distinguishes between competitive and 
cooperative strategic aims for cor1munication, and identifies four 
areas of focus for comnunication -strategies. Competitive communica~ 
ti.on functions as" ••• a vehicle through which one ind1.v1.dual attempts 
to distort the other's perceptions of the situation in order to obtain 
an advantage." (p.154) Cooperative communica€.ion, however, atte:rrlpts 
to accurately assess and convey each other's intentions, preferences 
and relative interdependence. Whichever goal is sought, the con-
municat1.ons between participants may focus on (1) issues, (2), the 
interpersonal relationship, (3) negotiation procedures, or (4) the 
actual making of offers. (p.154) 
According to Be1.secker, issue-oriented communications focus 
upon the preferences and alternatives open t~ participants in nego-
t1.at1.on, including the evaluation of alternatives. Relationship-
oriented communications focus upon the relative interdependence of 
the parties, including the social needs and desires of each. Pro-
cedure-oriented conmunicat1.ons focus upon the mechanics of the nego-
tiation process, i.e., the application of negotiation processes to 
' some problem. Finally, offer-rela~ed conmunication focuses upon 
, 
the solution or outcome of the negotiations, and includes the naking, 
accepting and rejecting of offers. 
As a whole, Beisecker's work offers both a method for 
classifying communication content, as well as a framework for 
conceptualizing the goal orientation of negotiators based upon 
the assessment of their communications. 
16. 
In addition to Beisecker's work, a study by Fitzpatrick and 
Winke (1979) attempted to generate a set of negotiation strategies. 
In the latter study, subjects were-asked to estimate how often they 
employed 44 different conflict-handling tactics. A factor analysis 
yielded five broad "strategies", specifically: Manipulation, Non-
negotiation, Emotional Appeal, Personal Rejection and Empathetic 
Understanding. The first strategy is described by the authors as 
a "diversionary" tactic, i.e., an attempt to gain compliance without 
addressing or acknowledging a conflict. The range of verbalizations 
fitting this ca~egory is fairly broad. The authors, however, empha-
size instances in which one party convinces (alters the preceptions 
of) the other that he (the latter) will gain more for himself from 
compliance than is actually the case. Non-negotiation is primarily 
the refusal to talk about or address the conflict, although repeti-
tion of the same position is listed in this category as well. Emo-
tional appeals are exclusively relationship-oriented in this classi-
fication scheme, centering largely around the other's needs and the 
power to withhold or supply affection, attention, etc. Personal 
Rejection is an attempt to "demoralize'" the other by disconfirming 
his actions, motives or personality. Finally, Empathetic understand-
ing involves an element of "tentativeness" and the exploration of 
ways in which to reach mutually acceptable agreements. (pp. 6-7) 
17. 
Taken collectively, Beisecker's work and the Fitzpatrick and 
Winke study indicate that a broad range of verbal strateaies exist 
for negotiators. Furthermore, it is possible to conceptualize 
most of these strategies as competitive or cooperative in nature, 
depending on whether the'goal is personal gain without regard for 
the other, or a mutually acceptable and efficient solution. 
Finally, the selection and utilization of verbal strategies should 
have some influence on the outcome which is eventually reached. 
Although communication has been studied extensively as a 
structural variable in matrix games, no study has examined the con-
tent of communications relative to the solution which is reached. 
In light of the previous analysis, such a study seems warranted and 
timely. In general, studies of communication in matrix-type formats 
-
have tested the prediction that communication availability is neces-
sary to develop trust and coordinate expectations, and thereby to 
identify and select the most'efficient solution. The consideration 
of communication content extends the prediction as foll?ws: Coop-
erative communication will be associated with the identification 
and selection of efficient alternatives, whereas competitive commu-
nication will be associated with less efficient alternatives. In 
any case, examination of communication content should contribute 
to a better uuderstanding of how individuals attempt to obtain 
goals in mixed-motive negotiation. 
In summary, both friendship and communication strategy may be 
variables which lead to systematic error in the formal gaming model. 
Social relationship may influence both the strategies selected and 
18. 
the agreements reached. Particularly, friends should engage in 
more competitive strategies and presumably reach less efficient 
solutions than non-friends. Communication is essential to the 
accurate estimation of each participant's preferences and utilities, 
and hence to the identification of an efficient solution. Moreover, 
communication may be critical in the shaping of perceptions of 
participants concerning both factual and less tangible elements of 
negotiation. 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
1. The differential use of verbal communication 
strategies will vary across conditions of friend-
ship, acquaintance and non-acquaintance. 
2. The efficiency of solutions reached will vary 
across conditions of friendship, acquaintance 
and non-acquaintance. 
3. The differential use of verbal coMMunication 
strategies will be correlated with solution 
efficiency. 
Hypothesis One predicts variation in the frequencies with which 
different types of verbal strategies are employed according to the 
type of social relationship. This prediction is derived fron theo-
retical literature which suggests that friends may be different (froM 
other relationships) in the approach to conflict situations because 
of greater interdependence, ego-involvement, and the sanction afforded 
by stability in the relationship. 
Hypothesis Two predicts variation in the efficiency of solu-
tions across relationship types. In other words, the relative 
efficiency of solutions reached in each group should be signifi-
cantly different from the relative efficiency of solutions reached 
in at least one other group. 
19. 
Hypothesis Three predicts correlations between strategy types 
and solution efficiency. In order to arrive at the most efficient 
solution with any consistency, the participants must have accurate 
information concerning their own and the other's preferences, alter-
natives, potential rewards and relative bargaining strength. Coop-
erative communication, among other things, has been characterized 
thus far as an attempt to provide just such an assessment. Compet-
itive communication, on the other hand, attempts to distort such 
inform~tion to the advantage of the comnunicator, It therefore 
seems reasonable to predict that a high incidence of cooperative-
type communications will be associated with the most efficient 
agreements, and that competitive strategies will be associated 
with less efficient solutions. 
CHAPTER THREE 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND DESIGN 
20. 
To test the predictions made in the previous ch·apter, thirty 
dyads were recruited from the SCHR Basic Program subject pool at 
the University of Kansas. Subjects were undergraduates who signed-
up to fulfill a research participation requirement. Recruitment 
procedures had three variations: Ten dyads were recruited by 
requiring that the individuals in each dyad considered themselves 
"good friends." Another ten dyads were recruited with the stipu-
lation that the members of each dyad were acquainted with each 
\ 
other. The remaining dyads were formed by first having two indivi-
duals sign up for each time bl'ock with no requirements concerning 
their relationship. It was assumed that a number of these would be 
acquainted. Subjects in this group were asked prior to the initia-
tion of experimental procedures whether or not they had interacted 
previously. Those who had experienced previous interaction were 
considered a part of the acquaintance group for purposes of cell 
formation and procedural variations in the experiMent. In all 
recruitment procedures, subJects were told the time, date and place 
of the experiment, and that they would be participating in a bar-
gaining-type arrangement. 
Procedure 
Subjects for each dyad were asked to report initially to separate 
r,ooms, for briefing. They were asked to read and (if acceptable) sign 
a consent statement which described in general terms the experimental 
procedures. Next, subjects in thG acquaintance and friendship 
groups were asked to complete a questionaire-type form which was 
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later used to measure levels of voluntary interdependence and 
person-qua-person appreciation in the relationship. Approximately 
twenty minutes was allowed for this task. Ethen collected the 
forms and distributed printed instructions for the bargaining 
session (Appendix A). After five minutes, E solicited questions 
from S's concerning the mechanics of the game. It was emphasized 
that negotiation methods and goals for the participants would be 
unrestricted, except that a ten minute time limit would be imposed. 
S's were then relocated in a cqnference-type room which was 
furnished with a table and two chairs. S's were seated initially 
on opposite sides of the table. Ethen provided S's with the 
necessary- materials to conduct the bargaining session. After 
allowing S's one ninute to stu~ the materials, E announced "start", 
and left the room for the duration of the session. S's were allowed 
a maximum of ten minutes to reach agreement, anu were asked to 
inform E if they reached an agreement prior to the deadline. The 
sessions were tape-recorded with the knowledge and consent of all 
subjects. After an agreement had been reached, S's were debriefed 
and dismissed. 
The Bargaining Game 
A variable-function, non-zero-sum game served as the stimulus 
to bargaining in the experimental sessions. The dual payoff matrix 




In each dyad, an individual was given a table containing 
either the numbers above the diagonals or the numbers below each 
diagonal. The values were explained to be the nuQber of points 
which would be won by an individual if an agreeMent was concluded 
at the A-by-B intersection at which that value was located. Each 
subJect was told that the values or points which his opponent 
would receive would be unknown to him unless his opponent chose 
to tell hiM. Likewise, the individual was not required to divulge 
to his opponent the number of points he would receive, although 
he was free to do so if he desired. The tables were assigned 
randomly to participants. 
Bargaining or bidding proceeded by the use of letter cor.ibina-
tions, each of which was a possible agreement which could be concluded. 
For example, one of the participants could bid "A2B2," meaning the 
intersection of column A2 and B2. Assuming that his table contained 
the values along the top of the diagonals, an agreement at this 
point would give him 450 points. Of course, his opponent would 
receive only 50 points from such an agreenent, and night refuse to 
agree to it, make a bid of his own, or discuss any P1ntter which 
, 
he thought relevant to the negotiations. Hence, the letter/number 
combinations were reference points for the identification of bids 
without necessarily identifying specific values (except to each 
player individually). 
Notice that the most efficient solutions to this game are A3Bl 
and A3B5. This is the game theoretic solution which should be 
reached by purely rational players. Notice further that the only 
solution which provides exactly equal payoffs to the participants 
is only fourth in the overall efficiency ranking. Hence, there 
was no immediate, prominent decision point which would also ) 
maximize efficiency. 
Subjects were free to bargain in whatever manner they chose 
within the time constraints. They were only required to record 
their agreement, if one was reached. When an agreement was reached, 
the bargaining session was completed. 
Measurement of Variables 
In order to differentiate between levels of friendship, the 
Acquaintance Description Form (Wright, 1978) was used. The ADF 
is a series of 80 statements which require responses on a semantic-
·differential type scale. The ADF yields raw scores on three primary 
variables, all of which are used in arriving at a "Total friendship" 
score: Voluntary interdependence, Person-qua-person factors, and 
General Favorability. The total friendship score is coMputed by 
adding the corrected Voluntary Interdependence and Person-qua-Person 
scores together. (Reliability and validity data for this instrument 
are found in Wright, 1978). 
For purposes of this study, it was necessary to arrive at a 
single friendship score for each dyad. The lower of the two scores 
was retained and assigned for the particular dyad as a conservative 
estimate of friendship strength. Friends were considered those indi-
viduals whbse corrected ADF scores fell above the mean average for 
the sample. Those whose scores fell below the mean were considered 
to be acquainted, but not friends and were therefore labeled 
acquaintances. At-test found the friendship and acquaintance 
scores to be significantly different (t=4.58; d.f.=18; p<.01). 
Non-acquaintances were simply assigned a value of "l" since it was 
assumed that they could not describe a non-existent relationship. 
The analysis of communication strategies was accomplished by 
content analysis of the tape recordings for each dyad. The cate-
gory scheme was generated from a variety of sources, including 
Beisecker (1970), Fitzpatrick and Winke (1979), and Crowell and 
Scheidel (1960). The four main headings--issues, interpersonal 
relationship, procedures and offers--were retained to serve as 
broad major categories in the classification scheme. Initially, 
a total of 43 subcategories were developed, most of which fell 
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into the issue-oriented heading. To test for conceptual clarity 
and reliability, eight graduate students in Speech Communication 
were asked to read and score _a transcript from an actual bargain-
ing session. The category -scheme was subsequently revised to 
decrease ambiguity and to differentiate between overlapping 
categories. In its final form, the classification scheme consisted 
of,33 subcategories. The reliability test using a different trans-
cript and different raters exceeded .90 (employing procedures 
described by Winer, 1962, pp. 283-89). The classification scheme ,, 
is given in Tables I-IV. 
The fundamental unit for classification was considered to be 
a complete sentence, whether simple or complex. Where more than 
one idea was expressed in a single sentence, any part of the sen-
tence which could stand alone as an independent idea was considered 
to be a unit for analysis. Furthermor~, "run-on" sentences, i.e., 
statements which actually consisted of a number of sentences, 
were supplied with the appropriate punctuation and treated as 
separate sentences. Fragment~d sentences were considered units 
for analysis only where some clear and substantive Meaning could 
1cea acceptance-- a statement of unqual1f,ed approval "or the jOS1t1on, idea or 
001n1on of anotner 
idea reJeCt1on -- a statemen.t of unqual1f1ed d1saoproval for the pos1t1on, 1cea 
or op1n1on of another 
pro-~od1f1cac1on· the acceptance of the essentials of another's pos1t1on or 1cea, 
but with Minor mod1f1cat1ons. 
con-mod1f1cat1on- the reJec:1on of all or most of another's op1n10n or oos,t1on 
and :he 1ntroduct1on of some substitute op1n1on or pos1t1on 
~os1t10n advanced- a statement of one's own evaluation of ootent1al alternatives, 
ut1l1t1es, evaluative cr1ter1a, or acceptao1l 1ty of offers 
1nformat1on adv.-- a statement conta1n1ng factual 1nformat1on perta1n1ng to one's 
ut1l 1t1es, preferences, al:ernat1ves, or previously stated 
pos,t,ons or ideas 
1nfornat1on denial- the stated refusal to supply 1nformat1on concerning one's 
ut1l 1t1es, preferences, alternatives or previously stated 
pos,t1ons or ideas 
asserted flex1b11, cy- the claim that one's pos1 t1on(s) 1s tentative and/or that 
one 1s w1ll1ng to modify the oos,t,on 
asserted r,g1d1tv·- tne claim that one's pos1t1on(s) 1s firm and will not change 
clar1f1cat1on --- the further development of an idea or pos1t1on through example, 
elaboration or explanation 
substant,at1on--- the stated offer of material proof for an assertion. 
request for acceotance- 1nqu1ry concerning another's d1ll 1ngness to agree d1t~ an 
idea or pos1t1on 
request for ?OS1C1on- 1nqu1r1 concerning anocner's evaluation of anv 3J~stant,ve 
mate-er 
request for info.- ,nqu1ry sol1c1t1ng factual 1nformat1on concerning the other's 
ut1 I ic1es, preferences, alternatives or previously stated ideas 
or pos1t1ons. 
request for substant1at1on- 1nqu1ry sol1c1t1ng material supper~ for an assertion. 
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J]!il.!.1.--RELATIONSHIP-ORIENTEO STRATEGIES 
asserted interdependence- the claim that both part,es have 1ncent1ve to reacn 
agreement 1n the negot1at1on session. 
asserted independence-- the claim that one has 1 ,ttle or no 1ncent,ve to reach 
agreement ,n the negot1at1on session. 
deemphas..' s the cla,m that the qual 1ty or character of the relat1onsh1p 
should have no bearing on the process or outcome of negot1at1ons. 
oersonal reJect,on- negative evaluation of the character of the other 
pos1t1ve self-eval - 0Os1t1ve evaluation of one's own cnaracter, either 1n 1sola-
t1on or 1n contrast to the other 
request for exo of affect• sol 1c1tat1on of tangible expression of affect througn 
deference and concess,on on the part of the other 
1nqu1ry--------- questions concerning the nacure or dynamics of ~ne ,nce,oersonal 
relat,onsh1p :>etween the oart,c,pan:s 
expans,on------- stacemencs ~h,ch Q~oade~ c~e scooe of ~1scuss1on to include as~ec:s 
of the relat1onsh1p .n,ch are ~eyond the ,~mediate barga,n,ng 
::on text 
i~SLE I 11--PROC~)URE-ORIE~iEO STR~TEGIES -----
1n1t1at1on------- the ,ntroduct,on of new or alternative processes oert,nent to 
negot, at I ans 
expressed concern- the claim that procedural d1ff1cult1es ex1s, and/or that such 
d1ff1cult1es should be addressed. 
acceptance------- statement of approval concerning ;:iroposed procedures or 
processes oert1nent co the negot1ac1ons 
reJect,on-------- statement of disapproval concerning procedures or orocesses 
~n,ch pertain co the negot1at1ons 
1nqu1ry---------- questions concer11ng the processes or mechan,::s of negot1at1ons. 
..!_;L--OFFER-RELATED Si~ATEGIES 
1n,c1at,on------- the subm,ss,on, whether tentative or f,nal, of an offer ~h1ch 
~as not previously been submitted, where subm1ss1on means a 
proposed agreement 
repet1t1on------- the .!:,!_Submission of any offer 
tentative acceotance- qual1f1ed acceotance of an offer, mod1f1ed by cne use of 
such words as ''maybe," ";:ierhaps ," or "poss 1bly " 
acceptance------- unqual 1f1ed and f,nal approval of an offer ma.de by another 
re;ect1on-------- disapproval of an offer made by the other, 1 e , refusal to 
accept the proposa I . 
26. 
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be gathered from context. For example, the fragment "perhaps so 11 
stated subsequent to "Would you agree that A2B4 is our best choice?" 
would be considered a unit for analysis., But the fragment "Maybe ••• 
uh ••• we could ••• " was not considered a complete thought unit and 
was discarded so far as analysis was concerned. 
It was necessary to delineate between competitive and coopera-
tive strategies for purposes of evaluatio~. The following were 
considered competitive verbal strategies and not consistent with 
the goal of efficiency (but rather with furthering one's own gain 










Request for expression of affect 
Procedure-rejection 
ReJection (of offers) 
Those strategies which were considered consistent with efficiency, 





Request for position 
Request f9r substantiation 






Request for acceptance 
Request for information 
Asserted interdependence 
Inquiry (concerninq the 
relationship) 
Expressed concern (over 
procedural difficulties) 
Expressed concern (over 
procedural difficulties) 
~nquiry (concerning procedures) 
Tentative acceptance (of offers) 
28. 
Procedural acceptance 
Initiation (of offers) 
Acceptance (of offers) 
Solution efficie~cy for the bargaining gane was determined 
according to the definition presented in Chapter One. Each pos-
sible solution in the bargaining matrix was assigned a rank based 
upon its efficiency relative to all other solutions. In all cases 
except one, there were two solutions for each rank, i.e., two 
solutions were most efficient, tvm solutions were second nost 
efficient, etc. This is so because in all except one case (where 
negotiators received exactly equal points), the reward distribution 
for each solution is exactly inverted in one other place in the 







(A3Bl) and (A3B5) 
(A5B3) and (A2B5) 
(A3B4) and (A1B5) 
(A4B4) 
(~2B3) and (A5B2) 
(AlB3) and (A5B4) 








(A3B2) and (A5Bl) 
(A2B1) and (A4B3) 
(AlB4) and (A5B5) 
(A2B4) and (A4B5) 
(A1B2) and (A2B2) 
(A4Bl) and (A3B3) 
Hypothesis One was tested using one-way analysis of variance 
for each strategy type. Three cells were formed for each analysis 
based upon corrected ADF scores, hence friendship- served as the -
independent variable. The dependent variable was frequency of 
strategy utilization for eacn dyad. 
29. 
Hypothesis Two was tested by subjecting the rank ordered solu-
tion efficiency for each dyad to a Kruskall-Wallis H test. Again, 
friendship served as the independent variable, and solution effi-
c.. 
ciency as the dependent measure. 
Finally, Hypothesis Three was tested using a series of Spearman-
type rank correlation analyses. The data for solution efficiency 
was rank-ordered as in Hypothesis Two, and served as one variable. 
In addition, the frequency data for employ~ent of verbal communica-
tion strategies was rank ordered for each dyad with respect to the 
number of times a strategy was employed. For each rank _correlation 
-analysis, there were thirty values for solution efficiency, and 
thirty corresponding valu'es for frequency of -a strategy. Tied 
ranks were corrected using procedures described by Spiegel (1961, 
p. 260). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The quantitative analysis for Hypothesis One consisted of 
twenty-four one-way analyses of variance, corresponding to the 
twenty-four verbal communication strategies which were actually 
employed by subjects. Overall, the results do not support the 
prediction that friends, acquaintances and non-acquaintances 
/ 
differentially employ verbal communication strategies. For 
issue-related strategies, only idea acceptance and pro-modifica-
tion approached statistical significance (p • .C.. 05). Personal 
reJection was the only relationship-oriented strategy which 
approached significance. None of the procedure or offer-related 
-, 
strategies were significant. Taken collectively, the data do not 
support Hypothesis One. 
Although significance was obtained for idea acceptance and 
pro-modification, the data is somewhat difficult to interpret. 
30. 
The theoretical development presented earlier suggested that 
friends would employ idea acceptance the least, followed by 
acquaintances and then non-acquaintances (who should have employed 
it the most). In fact, non-acquaintances employed idea acceptance 
the most, but friends employed it next most, followed by acquain-
tances. Hence, a linear progression based upon level of acquain-
tance was not obtained for this strategy. Furthermore, pro-~odi-
fication was employed most by friends, which was not predicted 
by theory. Since the data for these strategies was only Marginally 
significant, and since the majority of strategies were non-signifi-
cant, the results may be considered soMewhat tenuous. 
Of the remaining three categories, only personal reJection 
in the relationship-oriented class approached significance. The 
data indicated that friends employed the strategy most (in fact, 
' 
only friends used the strategy at all). Significance was only 
obtained at the .10 level, however, and hence remains suspect. 
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The Kruskall-Wallis test for relationship type by efficiency 
of solution yielded significant results (p.£..05). Hence, support 
was obtained for Hypothesis Two. The results are shown in Table v. 
The results, however, were pattered in a manner not entirely con-
sistent with the earlier theoretical development. Friends, who 
were supposed to select.the least efficient solutions, actually 
selected the most efficient, followed by acquaintances and then 
non-acquaintances. This finding seems especially noteworthy and 
will be explored further in the next chapter. 
The results for the rank correlation analysis (summarized in 
Table VI) do not support Hypothesis Three. Specifically, solution 
-
efficiency did not correlate well with the majority of verbal coM-
munication strategies. For the most part, there is no reason to 
believe that solution efficiency is linearly related with verbal 
communication strategies, although a number of specific correla-
tions are of considerable interest. 
Of those strategies which showed correlational significance, 
three were significant at the .01 level; namely, Asserted indepen-
dence, Positive self-evaluation, and (relationship) Inquiry. All 
three of these were associated with less efficient solutions. (In 
all cases of positive correlation, the particular strategy is asso-
ciated with less efficient solutions. Conversely, a negative 
correlation associates the use of a strategy with more efficient 
TABLE V 
SUl[l'A-qY OF Y..~USYAL-'.VALLIS H TEST 
FOR r:FFICI'E'{CY BY RELATIONSHIP TYPE1 
tJon-ac ::;_-:..a1nted Acquainted Friends 
7.0 22.5 14.5 
7.0 18.0 22 • .5 
7.0 29.0 18.0 
1.:..0 7.0 7.0 
22.5 26.5 7.0 
22.5 7.0 18.0 
25.0 7.0 18.0 
26-.5 7.0 7.0 
25-.0 14.5 7.0 




F= 3.42 • 
*?""' .05 a.f.=(2,29) 
1 Coc;~tations for this test are identical to tnose for a 
one-wa) analysis of variance, excep~ that the F-ratio is obtainea 
by use of t~e statistic 




SUMMARY OF RANK CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
FOR STRATEGY TYPE AND SOLUTION EFFICIENCY 
Strategy Type !: t 
Idea Acceptance .209 1.13 
Idea Rejection .163 0.87 
Pro-modification .251 1.37 
Con-modification .301 l.67 
Position Advanced .140 0.74 
Information advanced .098 0.52 
Asserted Flexibility -353 1.99• 
Asserted Rigidity .353 1.99• 
Request tor Position --325 -l.82• 
Re,quest tor Into. .217 1.17 
Asserted Interdep. .304 1.69 
' 
Asserted Independence .520 3o2jH 
Personal rejection .304 l.69 
Positive Selt-eval. .490 2.97•• 
Inquiry .460 2.72•• 
Procedure initiation --132 -Oo70 
Expressed concern -.157 -0.84 
Procedure acceptance .108 0-5'7 
Procedure rejection .234 1.27 
Inquiry --195 -1.05 
Offer initiation --368 -2.09• 
::iapetition --340 -1.91• 
Tentative Acceptance .133 0.71 
Rejection --380 -2.17• 
d.t.= 28 • P• "- .05 •• p.<.01 
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solutions). In addition, a'total of six strategies yielded 
correlations which were significant at the .05 level of confi-
dence: Asserted Flexibility, Asserted Rigidity, Request for 
Position, Offer Initiation, Offer Repetition and Offer Rejection. 
' 
A number of these correlations are particularly interesting and 
will be discussed in the next chapter. But overall, the bulk of 
the data does not support the hypothesis since only nine out of 
twenty-four correlations were significant. 
To summarize, the data analysis yielded support for Hypothesis 
Two, but did not provide support for Hypothesis One and Three. 
Chapter Five offers a more detailed interpretation of the results, 
and conclusions for the investigation. 
34. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
35. 
It was hypothesized that friends would select and use different 
verbal strategies than would acquaintances and non-acquaintances. 
It was further hypothesized that friends would agree on less 
efficient solutions than the other two groups. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that solution efficiency would be correlated with 
the selection of verbal strategies. 
The quantitative analysis for Hypothesis One indicated that 
there were no overall differences between groups with respect to 
-the frequency of usage for each strategy. On the other hand, 
Hypothesis Two was supported, but in a direction opposite from 
that predicted. The most efficient solutions were chosen by friends, 
while somewhat less efficient solutions were chosen by acquaintances 
and non-acquaintances. Hypothesis Three was not supported since 
no cl'ear and consistent pattern of correlation was found between 
-the strategies employed and the solutions reached. 
Theoretical Implic~tions 
According to the theoretical structure developed earlier in 
this study, friends should have exhibited quantitatively more 
competitive verbal communication strategies than the other groups. 
The logic was that structural aspects of the relation would permit 
greater freedom to play competitively, and that greater ego-
involvement would constrict the number of "acceptable" positions 
and solutions for each participant in this group. The data did 
not support this prediction and a number of explanations seem 
plausible. 
First, it may be that friendship has little or no effect on 
the strategic outlook or goal orientation of negotiators. The 
data ceFtainly do not support such a relationship in so far as 
verbal content is concerned. Although contradictory to the logic 
developed earlier, this must certainly be considered a possibility. 
Second, it is possible that aspects of the experimental con-
text served to moderate the behavior of individuals who might have 
acted more competitively in a different setting. For example, 
the verbal content of an argument between roomates might be much 
more competitive in the privacy of their apartment dwelling than 
in front of a microphone in a laboratory. The point is that the 
theoretical proP,osition may hold more truth than was indicated 
by the results of the experiment. 
Third, it is possible that the freedom to play competitively 
(integral to the prediction that friends would display competitive 
verbal strategies) exists only for very good friends. It is pos-
sible that the study did not obtain subJects at the level of 
friendship._ necessary for this behavior to be observed. This seems 
unlikely, however, since the friendship scores were fairly high, 
and they were significantly different from acquaintance scores. 
Finally, it is possible that verbal content simply is not 
the best measure of goal orientation or strategic outlook. In 
any case, relationship type does not appear to be a good predictor 
of verbal communication content in experimental negotiations. 
, 
The same theoretical justification was offered for·Hypothesis 
Two as for Hypothesis One. It was predicted that friends would 
select the least efficient solutions, followed by acquaintances 
37. 
and non-acquaintances. In fact, the opposite occurred, which 
seems to cloud the efficiency postulate somewhat. An interesting 
(although speculative) conclusion might be that those in the friend-
ship group better met the assumptions made by game theory. For 
example, it was assumed that voluntary interdependence varied 
' 
across relationship types, but that situational (structural) inter-
dependence was constant. Acquaintances and non-acquaintances who 
were less interdependent outside the experiment context (and 
could be expected to be less ego-involved) might also take the 
negotiations less seriously. A less serious view, coupled with 
the individualistic orientation provided in the instructions could 
have led to the less efficient solutions observed in the non-friend 
groups. Friends, on the other hand, may have chosen to function 
independently of prescribed orientations. In any case, friends 
behaved more "rationally" than the other groups if the solutions 
can be taken as an indication. 
Second, the results may simply be a function of the common 
sense notion that friends should display more cooperation than 
other types of dyad. The degree of positive affect toward each 
other could function to make friends behave in a more cooperative 
manner than non-friends, although this is not consistent with 
the theoretical development presented earlier. Nevertheless, 
mutual positive regard could account in part for the results. 
A third possible explanation relates to the greater rel~tion-
ship security which should exist for friends. Although relation-
ship security was suggested earlier as a reason why friends might 
compete more than others, security of this sort-could also work 
in another way. Friends, enjoying a secure interpersonal rela-
tionship, might feel no need to position or posture themselves 
in the bargaining situation. Persons less well acquainted, on 
38. 
the other hand, might perceive the need for positioning simply 
because of uncertain or less defined levels of security in their 
relationship. In any case, if greater relationship security exists 
for friends, it did not lead to deviation from the gaming Model 
and the theoretical solution. 
Finally, at least one additional explanation see~s plausible. 
Schelling (1960) and others have enphasized that coordination of 
' 
expectations is essential to cooperative behavior. Friends, who 
presumably know more about each other than non-friends, might be 
more adept at the sort of coordination necessary to quickly 
identify and choose the most efficient solution. That they did 
choose the most efficient solutions, partially supports this 
explanation. Since this finding occurred at the .05 level of 
significance, it does show promise of replication. 
Hypothesis Three predicted a significant correlation between 
the strategies employed and the solutions reached. The logic 
was that cooperative communication was necessary both to identify 
and select the most efficient solution. The data did not indicate 
a clear pattern in any direction, although one should not conclude 
that communication did not serve strategic ends at all. 
The category scheme and structure of the game May provide 
additional tools for interpreting the results. The category 
scheme may not have mirrored the intentions of the subjects, and 
therefore, led to somewhat inaccurate results. Furthermore, the 
structure of the game may have lessened the perceived importance 
of communication to affect the outcome. Consequently, subjects 
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may have failed to conceptualize and consistently use communication 
as a tool of strategy. 
Finally, a more complex analysis of the communication content 
might be necessary to detect a relationship between efficiency 
and communication. It is possible that several strategies pro-
duce an additive effect, or that specific strategies interact. 
Such an analysis would be quite complex and beyond the scope of 
this study, but it might be considered as a next step in the area 
of this topic. 
In terms of game theory, the results of this study are 
inconclusive, yet a number of conservative implications can be 
drawn. First, friendship does not appear to be a source of 
systematic error in the gaming model. Rather, friends behaved 
largely, in accordance with the efficiency postulate. It was 
lesser degrees of acquaintance which was associated with less 
efficient solutions. 
Second, this study did not find any appreciable correlation 
between the differential use of verbal communication strategies 
and solution efficiency. Hence, communication content cannot 
be considered a source of srstematic error in game theory at 
this tune. 
Validity of Results 
Int~rnal 
40. 
For the most part, the internal validity for this study seems· 
satisfactory. The ADF instrument has been tested a number of times 
(Wright, 1978) and can be assessed as both a reliable and valid 
indicator of voluntary interdependence and person~gua-person 
affect. The measurement of efficiency·can be considered valid 
according to definition (since the efficiency concept is mathe-
matical the rank~d solutions can be considered a valid-measure 
of efficiency). Internal validity for the measurement of ve~bal 
strategies, however, was not so clear-cut and requires further 
comment. 
Overall, the content analysis procedures for this study can 
be considered one valid means of measuring verbal communication 
strategies. On the other hand, the scheme may not be the best 
and a number of reservations seem warranted. First, although 
v 
the categories were shown to be conceptually distinct, there is 
no evidence that the subJects qonceptualized the same distinctions. 
For example, a subject who employed pro-modification may or may 
not have conceptualized himself as actually accepting the essen-
tials of the other's idea ~nd offering a minor modification. 
In a similar vein, the conceptual distinction between 
strategies offered by this category scheme is not necessarily 
a measure of functionally distinct strategies. In other words, 
a subject might have employed two or even three strategies without 
9onceptualizing any difference in their usage or purpose. If 
Idea acceptance and pro-modification were conceptualized and used 
by aubjects with the same idea in mind, the statistical analysis 
would not detect it. 
Finally,' the internal validity may be limited somewhat in 
the area of intent. Most of the strategy types were divided into 
one of two classes corresponding to either a competitive or 
cooperative goal orientation. It is important to note that this 
dichotomy is based upon the inferred intent of the participants. 
It might be difficult to prove that a subject who tentatively 
accepted an off~r actually had "cooperation" as the motive for 
doing so. In the general sense, inferred intent is not a perfect 
measure of actual intent. 
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In defense of the category scheme, it should be reiterated 
that a reliability coefficient (for raters) of greater than .90 was 
achieved, implying that the strategies were conceptually distinct. 
This suggest~ that subJects were at least able to conceptualize 
differences between strategy types. Hence, although the' observed 
verbalizations may not have mirrored the minds of subjects, they 
may be taken as an approximation of intent. And, of course, the 
general direction of the study was to examine the results of usage 
of verbal strategies and not necessarily the results of intent of 
the subJects (although a relationship between the two was assumed). 
In sum, the category scheme can be considered reasonably valid in 
terms of what it was designed to measure. 
External 
The-external validity of the results is limited by a number 
of factors. First, all subJects in the experiment were college 
students. It is not altogether clear just how college students 
Might differ from other persons in bargaining behavior. The 
4?,. 
Oskamp and Perlman (1966) results demonstrated that even students 
from different colleges behaved significantly different in a 
matrix game. Hence, the subJects must be considered a liMita-
tion to the external validity in this study. 
The stimulus for bargaining should also be considered a 
limitation for the results, particularly for the hypothesis 
involving verbal communication. As Beisecker notes, the potential 
influence of verbal coMmunication on bargaining procedures or 
agreements depends largely upon the degree of structure initially 
perceived by the participants. (p.153) It is not entirely clear 
how much structure was actually perceived by the participants in 
this study. It was eMphasized repeatedly that they were free to 
bargain in whatever manner they chose. There was clearly sone 
structure, however, including the time liMit and the bargaining 
matrix. At best, the results for the study must be limited to 
situations that are clearly perceived by participants to be 
commercial-bargaining, or gaMing situations. 
Finally,-the laboratory setting itself served as something 
of a linitation. The process of formally signing up for and 
attending a session which was known in advance to be an "~xperi-
ment" could have influenced subJects and coul0 be considered a 
contextual limitation to the results. The controlled environment 
of the experiment could further li~it generalization of these 
-results. The laboratory context, of course, was chosen for pur-
poses of standardization and control. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Both social relationship and communication strategy seem 
very' fruitful topics of research with respect to interpersonal 
negotiation. A number of directions for research should prove 
beneficial in the development of theory as well as practice. 
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First, the concept of friendship in negotiation merits further 
attention. The next step would seem to be soMe type of exploratory 
field work which would attempt to determine whether or not friends 
tend to use strategies which are measurably different fron those 
used in other types of relationship. The practical difficulties 
with field work in this area might be formidable and one alterna-
tive could be a sort of self-report instrument. Either of these 
approaches would sacrifice a degree of standardization and control 
found in laboratory work, but they might serve beneficially as 
a directional tool for experimental research. And, of course, 
the "real-life" setting of non-experimental work Might be more 
appropriate considering the personal nature of the subJect. 
Second, it would be desirable to attempt a replication of 
procedures stenm1.ng fron Hypothesis Two. Replication with similar 
results would serve to enhance the credibility of the results 
obtained in this study, and night suggest practical elements for 
successful negotiations. 
-
Third, it would seem profitable to explore aspects of the 
friendship relation beyond voluntary interdependence and Mutual 
intrinsic satisfaction. Although these two structural coMponents 
are important, it should be possible to integrate other charac-
teristics to forfl'I an even more precise definition of friendship. 
Fourth, it would be desirable to further explore methods of 
"measuring verbal communication content. Perhaps a pool of specific 
verbal comments could be generated which could be factor-analyzed 
and applied in a manner similar to that of this study. Verbiliza-
tions which are found to be correlated could be collapsed and 
might serve as a more sensitive measure than conceptual clarity. 
Fifth, it should be useful to develop a nethod for testing 
the relationship between the degree of prelir,inary structure and 
the character of verbal communication content. It is not clear 
from this study exactly how much structure could have affected 
the approaches and air,s of the participants. A more clearly 
defined and enpirically verified relationship should serve to 
clarify the results obtained in future studies such as the present 
one. 
Finally, it would be desirable to develop a Means for 
monitoring the intent or goals of negotiators throughout the 
experir,ent. Cleurly, there are some practical problems, but 
the inforr1a tion obtained would be very useful in coriparinq 
godls with results, goal consistency, and, of course, the con-
s 1.stcncy of goals with particular verbal strategies which are 
employed. 
Sumnary 
The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate differential 
social relationships and verbal communicatio~ strategies as paten-
tial sources of syster11atic error in game theory. Specifically, 
t:1.e study focused upon friendship as an antecedent influence anci _, 
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communication as a process variable affecting the agreements reached 
in mixed-motive interpersonal negotiations. 
The theory of negotiated games was examined and considered 
as a tool for the evaluation of contextual conflict interaction. 
The most primary assumptions of gar1e theory were reviewed. It was 
suggested that although game theory is a useful model, actual human 
interaction is nore complex that the theory ir1plies. It was pre-
dieted that friendship would serve as a competitive influence in 
negotiations leading to solutions which would differ from those 
predicted by game theory. It was further predicted that friends 
would display a larger number of competitive verbal coMmunication 
strategies that non-friends. Finally, it was predicted that com-
petitive verbal strategies woul<l be associated with less efficient 
solutions, and that cooperative strategies would be associated with 
the ~ore efficient solutions. 
To test these predictions, thirty dyads were recruited to 
participate in a bargaining session which was structured to be 
nuxed-motive in nature. The subJect's verbalizations an<l solu-
tions were recorded and subJecten to analysis. 
The results indicated that friends selected the nost effi-
cient agrcenents, but they did not enploy r,ore competitive or 
cooperative verbal strategies. Finally, no significant relation-
ship was found between verbal comrmnication strategies and solution 
efficiency. 
This chapter explored the theoretical implications of the 
results. It was suggested that friends CTay better meet the 
assuMptions of gaITTe theory, as is evidenced by their selection 
of the most efficient solutions. A number of reasons were sug-
gested for the lack of statistical significance for Hypotheses 
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One and Three. Finally, suggestions were, made for future research 





Verbal persuasive strategies in mixed-motive 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 1970, 56, 150-160. 
Borgatta, E.F. 
perception. 
Analysis of social interaction and sociometric 
Sociometry, 1954, .!1, 7-31. 
Coser, L. The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, IL.: 
Free Press, 1956. 
Frost, J.H. and Wilmont, W.W. Interoersonal Conflict. Dubuque: 
W. C. Brown Co., 1978. 
Harsanyi, J.C. On the rationality postulates underlying the_theory 
of cooperative games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1961,·1, 
179-196. 
-Iwakami, E.E. The friendship variable in coalitions in the triad. 
Unpublished master's thesis, University of Hawaii, 1960. 
Nash, J.F. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 1950, ~, 155-162. 
Nash, J.F. ,Two person cooperative games. Econometrica, 1953, ~, 
128-140. 
Oskamp, s. and Perlman, D. Effects of friendship and disliking on 
cooperation in a mixed-motive game. Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution, 1966, .!_Q_, 221-226. 
Rapoport, A. Two Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. 
Schelling, T.C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1960. 
Sherid, C.W., Sherif, M. and Nebergall, R.E. Attitude and Attitude 
Change: The Social Judgement-Involvement Approach.-Philidelphia: 
W. C. Saunders, 1965. 
Sp1.egal, M.R. Statistics, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961. 
Suttles, G.D. Friendship as a social ~nstitution. In G.J. McCall 
(Ed.), Social Relationshi'ps. Chicago: Aldine·, 1970. 
Swingle, P.G. and Gillis, J.S. Effects of emotional relationships 
between protagonists in the prisoner dilemma. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, ~, 160-165. 
Vinacke, W.E. 
theory. 
Variables in experimental games: Toward a field 
Psychological Bulletin, 1969, l.!., 293-318. 
Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, o. Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1947 
Wright, P.H. 
of self. 
Toward a theory of friendship based on a conception 
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Schedule of Points 
A 
l 2 3 4 5 
1 150 420 230 10 110 
2 450 50 390 210 260 
280 17'° 350 89- ., 230 
B 




320 : 200 270 60 370 I ' l l ! 
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?APER PROVID'::D I~ YOU NE7!:D TO 1.'.'RIT::! ANYTHI!iG. 
Schedule of Points 
A 
1 2 3 4 5 
l 210 80 270 350 390 
-
\ 
2 50 450 110 150 170 
3 . 
B 
150 260 10 420 200 ,;· 
----
4 370 60 320 180 280 
. 
5 l 180 230 230 300 60 
I I 
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APPENDIX B 
Instruction~ for Bargaining 
51. 
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Sample Schedule of Profit to You 
A 
2 3 4 5 
.1 10 30 60 160 210 I -- i--
2 15 45 90 240 315 
B 3 20 60 120 320 420 ----
4 8 24 48 128 168 -~ 
5 5 15 30 80 J05 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The session you are about to participate in is ,a bargaining 
game in which you and your opponent will be negotiating for 
imaginary money. The object of the game is to win as much 
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money for yourself as possible. Each point in the game represents 
one dollar of imaginary money. Although there will be no real 
exchange of P1oney, I would like you to bargain as though you were 
playing for actual dollars. 
On the page preceding this one, there is a sample of the type 
game you'll be playing. So that you'll thouroughly understand how 
the game works, let's take a look at the sample and I'll explain. 
As you can see, the sample is a tab le of m.1Mbers and the letters "A" 
and "B". The numbers represent points which you wil 1 receive if an 
agreement is reached at a specific_ intersection between A and B. 
Notice that there are five columns listed by number across the top 
of the table. We will call these colunns Al, A2, A3, A4 and AS. 
Also we can see that there are five rows numbered froP1 top to bot-
tom of the table. These we shall call Bl, B2, B3, B4 and BS. It 
is possible to identify any space in the table hy using these 
letters and nurlbers. For example, the upper left-hand box or 
space could be called "AlBl". Likewise, the box containing the 
value 168 could be called "ASB4". 
You may wonder why we're using these letters an<l numbers since 
your values are already specified in the boxes of the table. The 
reason for this is that your opponent will also have a table, but~ 
his table will not be exactly the same as yours. For example, the 
sample table shows that an agreeMent at "A4B2" would give you 240 
points, but your table does not tell you what your OP.ponent would 
receive froM such an agreement. Indeed, your opponent's table of 
profits will be known only to hin unless he chooses to tell you 
what they are. Likewise, your profits will be known only to you 
unless you choose to tell your opponent. 
Since you won't know each other's prof1.t levels (number of 
points) 1.t will be necessary to identify your bids using the let-
ters and numbers which specify a given box in your tables. For 
exaMple, you may look over your table and decide you would like 
to obtain 320 points. 
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Notice that 320 lies at the intersection of coluMn A4 and row 
B3. You rnight then inform your opponent th.at you would like to 
-
"bid II or reach agreement at 11 A4B3". Your opponent r,ay then con-
sult his own table to see how nany points he would receive if he 
agreed on A4B3. If he finds his own profit acceptable, he nay 
agree to your proposal. In this case, the bargaining 1.s over 
and you should inform me that you have reached agreeMent. If 
your opponent does not find his level of profit to be satisfactory, 
he may reJect your bid, nake a bid of his own, or talk about any-
thing else wh1.ch he considers relevant to the bargaining session. 
You will have essentially the same opt1.ons. You nay reJect your 
opponents bids, make b1.ds of your own, or talk about anything else 
you consider relevent to the bargaining session. Either of you 
may resubmit a previous bid at any tine. 
Throughout the session, you may reveal as nuch or as little 
about your options and points as you wish. You nay even nisrepresent 
them if you like. There are no restrictions on your bargaining 
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procedures, except that any agreeMent must be labeled "A_B_". 
The latter requirement 1s for clar1ty. Keep in mind that you 
need not agree to any b1d that you do not want to. To m1.n1.mize 
any confusion on this point, I will provide you with a slip of 
paper to fill out when you reach an agreement. You will be asked 
to fill 1.n the letter/number combination which is agreed upon, 
and to s1gn your naMes to it. Until the paper 1.s signed, you 
May bargain 1.n whatever 'Tlanner you choose. Once the paper 1.s 
signed, the bargaining 1.s over. 
In a few £11inutes, we'll go 1nto another rooM where you will 
s'it across a table from your opponent. At that ti£11e, I will give 
you the actual game natrix listing your optio~s and respective pro-
fits to you. I'll give you about a minute to look over the natrix 
before actual bargaining begins. I will then say "start." Either 
of you may begin the bargaining 1.n the manner you see fit. You 
will have precisely 10 minutes to negotiate. If no agree~ent has 
been reached after the 10 ninute neadline, then you have earned 
no points. 
It is to your advantage, then, to reach an agreement. You 
need not arrive at a decis1on too hastily, however, since lO 
minutes is plenty of time for negotiation. To help you keep 
track of time, I'll signal you after 5 Minutes, and again after 
9 minutes have elapsed. 
When you reach an agreement, please remerlber to record it 
on the slip of paper provided and sign it. If you finish hefore 
the 10 Minutes is over, please inform ~e. 
